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RECENT DECISIONS
However, the last clause of the statute, "unless a different disposition
shall be made or directed by the will," eliminates its application in
favor of the grandchild since the will directed a gift over to Sarah's
children and, if none, to her surviving brothers and sisters.
Also, it is probable that section 238.13 would not be applied to pre-
vent lapse of the gift over to the surviving brothers and sisters, al-
though to them no different disposition was made and they were
survived by issue, since the will expressly provides that the brothers
and sisters must "survive" the testator. It could be argued that in
every case of a devise it is presumed that the devisee will survive the
testator; and that, therefore, the word "surviving" adds nothing in
essence to the will. However, since Wisconsin courts hold so firmly
to the expressed intent of the testator, and since none of the brothers
or sisters survived the testator, it is doubtful whether the anti-lapse
statute would apply.
JOSEPH SwivrE.LI
Adoption - Constitutionality of "Same Religion" Statute -
Petitioners, husband and wife, sought to adopt twin children. The
judge made findings of fact, concluding that it would not be for the
best interest of the Catholic twins to be adopted by a Jewish couple
and dismissed the petition. General Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 210, 5B,
inserted by St. 1950, c. 737, 3, is as follows:
"In making orders for adoption, the judge when practicable
must give custody only to persons of the same religious faith
as that of the child. In the event that there is a dispute as to the
religion of said child, its religion shall be deemed to be that of
its mother. If the court with due regard for the religion of the
child, shall nevertheless grant the petition for adoption of a
child proffered by a person or persons of a religious faith or
persuasion other than that of the child, the court shall state the
facts which impelled it to make such a disposition and such
statement shall be made part of the minutes of the proceedings."
The court found that the mother and the "natural father" of the twins
were Catholic. The petitioners, who were found to be financially and
physically equipped to bring up the twins and to intend to care for
them to the best of their ability, were of the Jewish faith and intended
to bring up the twins in that faith. The court found that the mother
of the twins consented to the adoption and knew that the petitioners
were Jewish and was satisfied that the twins should be raised in the
Jewish faith. The court also found that many Catholic couples were
available with whom the twins could be placed. Held: The findings
of the lower court were proper, and the statute involved was con-
stitutional and not contrary to the First Amendment to the Constitu-
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tion of the United States nor to art. 2 of the Declaration of Rights
or art. 11 and art. 46, 1, of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Rouben Goldman & another,
Petitioners, 121 N.E. 2d 845 (Mass. 1954).
The problem presented in this case can be approached from two
points of view. The first point of view is the purely legal one of what
the law is. The second approach is the ethical or moral one of what
the law should be.
As to the purely legal problem there is in the first instance a
question of the interpretation of the statute and, secondly, once the
meaning of the statute has been interpreted, whether the statute is
constitutional.
The rule in such cases prior to the enactment of the statute, as
followed by the court in the earlier Purinton case' was:
"generally, in the absence of specific, applicable statutory pro-
vision, the court will not allow a difference of religion to defeat
an adoption that it feels will serve the welfare of the child,
which is the paramount consideration governing the discretion
of the court in adoption proceedings."
2
The statute was interpreted in the Gally case,3 where the court said:
"It does not seem to us that when the Legislature inserted
section 5B it intended to cast aside the familiar and obviously
pertinent criteria which had been so long employed in determi-
ning questions of child custody .... There is, however, a cer-
tain element of compulsion upon the judge indicated by the
word 'must'. But the compulsion operates only 'when practi-
cable'.
"The phrase, 'if the court shall find it practicable,' implies a
legal discretion, the exercise of judgment based upon the whole
evidence of all the facts that affect the question of practicability
within the usual and ordinary sense of the word. The question,
therefore, depends upon the circumstances of each particular
case.
... All the familiar tests are therefore still to be considered.
Each case is to be determined on its own facts. The difference
is that, whereas before the new statute there was no definite
rule binding upon the judge in any set of circumstances as to
how much weight was to be given to any one of the several
as against the others, he is now bound to give controlling effect
to identity of religious faith 'when practicable,' but not other-
wise."4
Thus it would seem from an interpretation of the above quotations
'-Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 189, 80 N.E. 802, 805; 18 L.R.A., N.S.
926 (1907).
2 See Note, 23 A.L.R.2d 701 at p. 702.
3Petition of Gaily, 329 Mass. 143, 107 N.E.2d 21 (1952).
s Ibid.
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that whether the judge shall give custody to those who are not of the
same religious faith is a determination of fact which it is proper for
the lower court to make and which, when made, will not be reversed
unless plainly wrong. This is the position the court takes in the
principal case. The judge's criterion is "when practicable" as to when
an adoption of a child of one religion by those of another religion
who seek to adopt may be approved under the statute. The court
reasons also that the lower court is, as are all triers of fact, in a
better position to determine this than the appellate court would be.
Therefore, as far as interpretation goes, the one here seems reasonable
and not open to attack since it allows the trial judge sufficient leeway
to protect the interests of all parties concerned.6
The next question in an analysis of what the law is, is to determine
whether the statute is constitutional. The ground upon which con-
stitutionality is attacked is that the phrasing violates the First Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States as regards "establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"1 as made applic-
able to the states by the 14th Amendment." The argument would
seem to be that since the court decided that the religion of the twins
involved in the principal case was Catholic, this was an establishment
of religion for them, and, hence, unconstitutional. This would seem
to be but a semantic equivocation. What the court did here was to
determine what the religion of the twins factually was, or, in other
words, what religion had been established for them by the parents.
A determination of such a fact, as here, is certainly not in contra-
vention of the First Amendment.
Another First Amendment problem is raised by the claim that to
determine the twins' religion as Catholic is to interfere with the reli-
gious freedom of the natural mother who has consented to the chang-
ing of their religion. In this respect it is important to remember that,
according to the findings of fact here, at no time did the mother
do any more than consent to the change of religion and did not herself
try to change that religion. It is apparent that there is a distinct dif-
ference between giving consent or merely not objecting to a change
of religion and the affirmative act of performing the necessary
requirements to change the religion. Or to put the matter in another
way, the statute or the act of the court did not prohibit the mother
5 See also Petition of Darte, 122 N.E.2d 890 (1954).
6 Por an excellent discussion of the question here see Note, Religion as Factor
in Adoption Proceeding, 23 A.L.R.2d 701. and Religion as a Factor in Adop-
tion, Guardianship and Custody, 54 COLUM. L. Rxv. 376.
7 U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
8 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203(1948).
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from changing the religion of the child. She at no time sought to
exercise a right to change it. Consequently the child was still a
Catholic.
The court, however, chooses to answer this objection on a different
ground by showing that since, by presentment of the petition, the
natural mother had renounced her parental claim to further determi-
ning their religion, and her freedom was gone as a result of her free
act, and not as a result of the operation of the statute.
The constitutional religious problems raised by the statute were
handled by the court in these words:
"All religions are treated alike. There is no 'subordination' of
one sect to another. No burden is placed upon anyone for main-
tenance of any religion. No exercise of religion is required,
prevented, or hampered. It is argued that there is interference
with the mother's right to determine the religion of her off-
spring, and that in these cases she has determined it shall be
Jewish. Passing the point that so far as concerns religion she
seems to have consented rather than commanded and seems to
have been 'interested only that the babies were in a good home,'
there is clearly no interference with any wish of hers as long as
she retains her status as a parent. It is only on the assumption
that she is to lose that status that 5B becomes operative. The
moment an adoption is completed all control by the mother
comes to an end."
Thus the court here feels that the statute is not in contravention of
the provisions forbidding interference with the freedom of religion
under various applicable constitutions. It appears that this view is prob-
ably the one most likely to stand since from a purely common sense
viewpoint there is apparently no favoritism nor "establishing of any
religion."
Therefore, it would seem from a purely legal point of view, the
decision in this case was proper and reasonable and one quite likely to
be followed in construing such a statute.
The second view to be considered in the analysis of this decision
is the question of what the law should be. Is it morally proper for
the state to determine by positive law that a child proffered for
adoption should be adopted, "when practicable," by those of the same
religious faith as the child? The writer feels that this is a proper
statute under the moral law.
In reasoning to this conclusion, it is to be noted that the status of
9 However, some courts have taken a more cautious view as to the effect of
such statute: see State v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569, 162 S.W. 119 (1913) ; State
ex. rel. Evangelical Lutheran Kinderfreund Society of Minnesota v. White,
123 Minn. 508 (1913); In re Duren, 355 Mo. 1222, 200 S.W.2d 343, 170
A.L.R. 391 (1947); In re Walsh's Estate, 100 Cal. App. 2d 194, 223 P.2d
322 (1950).
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the relation between the adopted child and the adoptive parent will
never be the exact equivalent of the relation between the child and
the natural parent. This is true because the relation of the natural
parent and the child springs from the very nature of mankind, ex-
pressed in marriage which is the source of the legitimate procreation
of all children. The relation of the natural parent and child, and their
rights and duties, are based on the fact of natural generation in the
married state. In general this parental right is a fundamental one
and must be protected in the same way as are the rights to life and
liberty. These rights cannot be taken away except upon the justifi-
cation of the common good. On the other hand, the relation of the
adoptive parent and the child is in general a pure creature of the
positive law. In fact, in early English common law the right to adop-
tion was unknown. In the United States it is said to exist only by
virtue of statute.'0 This is reasonable because, although the act of
adoption is one that is extremely useful and salutary and charitable,
there is no necessity for it arising from the very nature of man him-
self.
Once it has been established that the adoptive relation arises purely
from legal statute and is not based on the nature of the parent, and
child, and further, that the natural parental relation is a moral neces-
sity, then it follows that certain rights and duties do not arise from
one that is not a morally necessary one. Hence there is nothing in the
statute offensive to the natural law.
It is the contention here that one of the rights of the parent flowing
from the natural relation is to choose a religion for a child and to bring
him up in that religion. This is a necessary right for the proper moral
and spiritual development of the child.
A very difficult question arises as to whether the natural parent
can affirmatively change the religion of the child once that it had been
established. This question will not presently be discussed because it
is not at issue under the facts here. Here we are concerned with the
right of the adoptive parents to change the religion of a child placed
under their care. The right to change the child's religion would not
seem necessarily to flow from the adoptive relation because it should
be presumed that, since the child has a religion which, if followed,
would insure proper moral and spiritual development, there is no com-
pelling reason for a change. Of course, if the natural parent has not
created a religious status for the child, the statute does not apply.
Therefore, by the above process of reasoning, the conclusion is
reached that there is nothing contrary to the moral law to insist that
a child of one religion be adopted by those of the same religious faith,
20 1 AM. Jux., Adoption of Children § 3, p. 622.
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unless there is some strong reason making it not "practicable." This
also seems to conform with a common sense view of the matter.
Thus it is submitted that this decision is both proper and reason-
able, both legally and morally, and is one that should be followed in
the case of similar statutes.
C. WILLIAM ISAACSON
